Abstract First, we emphasize that the real estate price peaks which are currently under way in many industrialized countries (one important exception is Japan) share many of the characteristics of previous historical price peaks. In particular, we show that: (i) In the present episode real price increases are, at least for now, of the same order of magnitude as in previous episodes, typically of the order of 80% to 100% . (ii) Historically, price peaks turned out to be symmetrical with respect to the peak; soft landing, i.e. an upgoing phase followed by a plateau, has rarely (if ever) been observed. (iii) The inflated demand is mainly boosted by investors and high-income buyers. (iv) In the present as well as in previous episodes, the main engines in the upgoing phase have been the "hot" markets which developed in major cities such as London, Los Angeles, New York, Paris, San Francisco or Sydney. In our conclusion, we propose a prediction for real estate prices in the West of the United States over the period [2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011]. We also point out that investment funds, which already play a key role in stock markets, have in recent times began to heavily invest in real estate. In the future, one can expect them to become major players in property markets worldwide. The outcome of the present episode will tell us how quickly this transformation evolves. Thus, if the height of the present peak substantially surpasses the magnitude of previous ones, one may infer that investment funds have been able to establish strong communication channels between real estate assets on the one hand and financial assets (e.g. bonds, stocks, options) on the other hand.
Introduction
In May 2005, one of my Californian colleagues who closely monitors the American real estate industry wrote to me: "I think the future is very hard to even estimate, much less predict, because this market has no historical precedent that I can identify. For one thing, both originating lenders and the secondary market seem to have thrown caution to the wind". Are we really in unchartered territory? Answering this question will be one of the main objectives of this paper. Fig. 1 provides a few quick preliminary clues. It shows that real estate prices in the West of the United States experienced four peaks during the past 40 years. The three previous peaks provide possible guiding lines as to the future of the fourth peak that is currently under way. Naturally, there is no absolute certitude that the peaks give the amplitude of the peak (the ratio of peak price to initial price) and the amplitude of the fall in the downgoing phase (ratio of trough price to peak price). The notation 1.7+ shows that the current peak is still in its upgoing phase and will have an amplitude larger than 1.7. The whole curve has been smoothed using a three-year centered moving average. Source: U.S. Bureau of Census present peak will unfold as the previous ones; there are mainly two new factors (i) The present peak has a bigger amplitude and duration than the previous ones; in itself this would probably not preclude a repetition of the previous scenarios (ii) Investment funds (in which we include pension funds, equity funds, hedge funds) have taken a much greater part in the present episode than in previous ones. This explains the exceptional size of the peak but, as these institutions can mobilize much larger amounts of capital than the real estate companies which operated in previous episodes, they may be able to stage a softer landing. We come back to this question in the conclusion.
The paper focuses on three issues.
• It emphasizes that real estate price peaks occurred repeatedly in the 19th and 20th centuries.
• It examines whether during peak episodes, prices are driven by demography or by speculative trading.
• It shows that the "engines" of peak price episodes are the "hot" markets of big cities. From the point of view of economic theory, the second question is crucial because it tells us which variables a model should contain. If prices were driven by demography the model would have to include a large number of exogenous variables such as for instance population change, revenue increase, price of construction (salaries, materials, interest rates), etc. On the contrary, if speculative trading is the main moving force, price peaks may be described in the framework of self organized criticality introduced by late Per Bak. The task of developing such a model will be left to a subsequent paper.
From a macroeconomic perspective, real estate price peaks are of great importance. Let us recall that the recession experienced by the Californian economy between 1991 and 1995 had its origin in the real estate market crash of 1990 (for more details see Roehner 2002, p. 115-117) . On an even larger scale, the property crash in Japan during the 1990s affected adversely the Japanese economy. It lead to a disappearance of wealth that amounted to 1.6 quadrillion yen that is to say twice the country's GDP. Instead of using about 10% of their salaries to service their loans, Japanese households had to devote more than 20% of their salaries to the repayment of their debt (Straits Times, November 9, 2002) . At the time of writing, the price of land in Japan is still declining (Wall Street Journal, July 11 2005): since mid-1991 it has been divided by 2.1.
Historical examples of real estate price peaks
In order to give a microeconomic underpinning to real estate price surges, let us briefly recall an episode which took place during the rush to the West in the late 19th century. As ticket prices to Southern California dropped substantially, emigration soared. More than 41,000 people came to San Diego between 1885 and 1888. By the peak of the building boom in 1888, at least 10 brickyards employing over 500 workers were operating in San Diego. In late 1888, San Diego's real estate market began to deflate. One of the largest brickyards, the Park Brick Yard Company, went out of business. By 1889, people were leaving in droves, driving San Diego's population down to less than 17,000. A similar real estate boom occurred in Los Angeles; it came to its end in 1889, that is to say a few months after the one in San Diego.
Were the market collapses in Los Angeles and San Diego brought about by a nationwide economic recession? The answer is no. As a matter of fact in 1888-1889, with an unemployment rate as low as 4%, the state of the economy was good. It is only in subsequent years, with the onset of the depression of 1893-1894 that unemployment rates picked up, reaching levels of 10% in 1893 and 15% in 1894 (see the data provided by David O. Whitten in the article about the Depression of 1893 in the eh.net encyclopedia).
Did the crash of the property market in California have an impact on the economy nationwide? Again, the answer is no. As we have just seen, the recession occurred 6 years later and can of course not be attributed to the property crash. How can one explain that it had no sizable impact on the economy? In 1890, California had a population of 1.2 million which represented less than 2% of the US population. Moreover, the property crash in the West was not paralleled by a similar crash in the East. This is made clear by Fig. 2a, which mortgage installments a foreclosure sale takes place. The two peaks correspond to the recession of 1878 and to the Great Depression respectively. Sources: Wenzlick (1972) , Kaiser (1997) • Secondly, property markets in the North-East and in the West were quite disconnected. It is only in the last decades of the 20th century that they have become more correlated.
Other historical examples of real estate price peaks are given in Fig. 2b , 3 and 4. Fig. 2b is of interest because it emphasizes the similarity in the shape of two peaks which occurred in different time periods and in distant countries. In the same way, Fig. 3 points out the close parallelism between the peaks of 1889 and 1929: they have the same amplitude (amplitude of a peak being defined as the ratio (peak price) / (initial price)) and almost the same duration. Fig. 4 shows the 1985-1995 price peak in Britain (more will be said about this case in section 4).
These various examples along with additional evidence given in Roehner (2004, p. 112-114) suggest the following rules of thumb.
1) Roughly speaking price peaks are almost symmetrical with respect to their maximum, which means that the rising and falling phases have approximately the same duration.
2) The total duration of a peak is about 12-14 years which means that the upgoing and downgoing phases last about 6-7 years 3 . 3) Usually the amplitude of the peak is less than 3 because price increases are restrained by income levels 4 . Fisher and Kent (1999) plan to sell them one or two years later; speculative trading also includes transactions in properties which are still in their design stage (sometimes referred to as "off-the-plan transactions") which are sold one or two years before actual completion.
Whether or not a property boom is driven by speculation is always a hotly-debated question because of its obvious implications. If the boom is driven by demography, one may expect that the period of price increase will be followed by a plateau without any substantial price fall. On the contrary, if prices are pushed up by speculation, one should expect a price pattern similar to those described in section 1. Needless to say, such a price pattern may scare away potential buyers, which is why real estate agents may be tempted to present it as a remote and unlikely perspective 5 . Here we will restrict ourselves to listing a number of criteria which should help us to come up with a definite conclusion. 1) Are the increases in property prices much faster than GDP growth? 2) Are prices of expensive houses rising faster than prices of more affordable houses? 3) Are stock prices of real estate companies climbing to towering levels? 4) Does the proportion of transactions carried out by investors grow along with the level of prices?
As an illustration of the first criterion one can mention the case of Hong Kong between 1992 and 1998 (see Fig. 8 ). The average price of apartments jumped from US$ 2,100 to US$ 8,600 which represents an annual growth rate of 41%. Obviously this is completely disconnected from GDP growth.
The second criterion is closely related to the price multiplier effect which is explained in the next section. It has been shown elsewhere (Roehner 2000 , 2001 chapter 6, 2002 chapter 7, Maslov et al. 2003 ) that this phenomenon, referred to as the price multiplier effect, can be observed in all kinds of speculative price peaks whether in property, collectible stamps, rare books or stocks. In a sense, it can be seen as a signature of speculative price peaks. A related consequence is described in Fig. 5 : it 5 The fact that the views of real estate analysts may be affected by conflicting interests does not facilitate the emergence of a clear understanding. This can even restrict data availability; thus, in the period 1999-2003 it was very easy to find (free) Australian real estate price series on the Internet, but after the downturn many real estate institutes restricted access to subscribers. Similarly, after the downturn, in spite of prices falling at annual rates of 8%-10%, real estate experts would continue to use such euphemisms as "the flat market in Sydney" or "the market has cooled down". 
com); US Bureau of the Census: New residential sales (New houses sold by sales price).
shows that as price climb sales tend to concentrate on the most expensive market segments; this effect is particularly strong in the North East of the United States. Finally, the very fact that during a price peak episode, prices are often rising simultaneously in several industrialized countries irrespective of local conditions shows that a common driving force is at work in all these markets. At the time of writing (July 2005) prices are still rising in California as well as in Paris, but they tend to flatten in Britain whereas in Melbourne or Sydney they have been falling for about one year. forth. In contrast, the boom of 1985-1995 in Britain concerned only residential property. What we say in this section applies only to the second type of real estate booms.
The major role played by big cities is illustrated by the fact that in the United States there have been price peaks of an amplitude greater than two almost only in the North-East (Boston, New York) and in California (Los Angeles, San Francisco) and marginally in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. Fig. 4 further explains how price increases spread from big cities to neighboring areas. The highest curve corresponds to London; as can be seen the time lag between the maximum in London and the maxima in northern counties is comprised between one and two years.
This observation has interesting practical implications. It means that the market downturn can first be observed in the hottest places. For instance, during the third and fourth quarter of 2004, prices in London have been falling, whereas they were still increasing in the rest of Britain (albeit at a slower rate than earlier). This seems to suggest that by July 2005 (at time of writing) Britain already was in the downward phase of the price peak. The same conclusion holds for Australia, where Sydney (which is the hottest market) has seen declining real estate prices since 2004.
The fact that price increases are positively correlated with prices at the beginning of the price peak is illustrated in Fig. 7 in the case of the Western region of the United States. Thus, the average price in Las Vegas, which was $ 120,000 in 1995 had been multiplied by 1.2 in 2002, whereas the average price in San Francisco, namely $ 280,000 in 1995, had been multiplied by 1.8 in 2002. Additional evidence about the price multiplier effect can be found in Roehner (2000) , Roehner (2001, chapter 6) , Maslov et al. (2003), and Roehner (2004) .
In section 2 we observed that prices continue to climb until they reach an "unsustainable" level. How can this level be identified? Figure 8 provides a clue. It shows that during a property boom, prices increase faster than rents. Therefore, there is a moment when the yield 6 of apartments becomes lower than the average yield of financial markets. At that point the price increase becomes the only real source of profit; this is an unstable situation in the sense that any downward price fluctuation may generate a spate of selling and trigger a market wide downturn.
What is the role of interest rates? As already mentioned, real estate price peaks have their own dynamic. While declining interest rates may boost prices and transaction volumes in the upgoing phase, they cannot stop a market from falling once the downturn has occurred. This was demonstrated in the United States in 1992-1994, a period of declining interest rates and of falling real estate prices in California. More recently in 2004, the fall in real estate prices in Australia continued in spite of declining interest rates: in July 2002, at the height of the real estate boom, the yield (i.e. interest rate) of the 10-year (Australian) Treasury bond was 5.86%; in November 2004 it was down to 5.22% but this did not prevent the downward spiral of property prices in Sydney to continue.
Conclusion
In this conclusion we first present a projection for prices in the West of the United States over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . Then, we explain why it may be possible to offer predictions for real estate prices whereas making predictions for stock markets is much more difficult if not altogether impossible. projection. In previous papers we described speculative price peaks by a function of the form:
where p 2 , t 2 denote the peak-price and peak-time respectively; α and τ are two adjustable parameters. In the present case it turns out that the exponents α are almost equal to 1, namely 1970-1982: α = 0.99, 1982-1992 : α = 1.06; the parameters τ turn out to be almost the same as well, namely of the order of 13.5 quarters (i.e. 3.3 years). As a result, one is encouraged to model the downgoing path of the current episode by the same parameters. This leads to the dotted line projection in Fig.  9 7 . Needless to say, this projection rests on the assumption that there is no fundamental change with respect to the two previous episodes. In particular, we assume that in spite of their expanding assets, investment funds will not be able to rule property markets in coming years to the same extent as they are able to direct stock markets.
Apart from their own specific interest, speculative episodes in property markets are also of great value because they are similar to, but simpler than, speculative episodes in stock markets. The first point, the similarity of price peaks in property versus stock has been briefly summarized above (more details can be found in Roehner 2004a). The fact that property markets are "simpler" than stock markets can be attributed to the following circumstances. (i) Transactions take much longer in real estate than in stocks, typically one or two months compared to one or two minutes; as a result property prices are subject to only low frequency shocks whereas stock prices are subject to shocks whose frequency spectrum extends over several orders of magnitude (from 1/minute to 1/year). (ii) Most of the financial instruments available on stock markets (such as for instance options, futures, convertible bonds) do not (yet) exist in property markets. (iii) As shown in a former paper (Roehner 2004b) , the strategy of Fig. 1 . The two downgoing phases are characterized by exponential price falls with rates of the order of −6.5%. The projection was modeled on the same pattern. Note that the precise moment of the downturn cannot be forecast in the same way because it depends on exogenous factors such as interest rate levels or exchange rates. However, after the downturn one can expect a subsequent 5-year period characterized by a downward trend with a rate averaging about −6% per year. . big investment funds have a determinant impact on the price of stocks 8 . Such funds also have much influence in commercial real estate; in contrast, their involvement in residential real estate has so far been smaller although this situation may change in the next decades 9 .
Until recently, there was but little communication between stock and real estate markets, but with the advent of financial globalization the boundaries between the two sectors tend to disappear. For instance, on September 2004, Fidelity Investment opened a real estate branch called Fidelity International Real Estate. For the time being the assets of this fund remain fairly modest but there can be little doubt that this marks the start of a growth trend. The outcome of the present episode will show how quickly the transformation occurs. If the amplitude of the peak in Fig. 9 turns out to reach a level 8 One can recall in this respect the action of Jeffrey Vinik, the manager of Fidelity Magellan, a fund of parent company Fidelity Investment whose assets represent about 10% of the American GDP. In late 1995, concerned by earning growth problems in the technology sector, he cut the fund's investment in this sector from 43% to 24%. Although perhaps sound in itself, Vinik's strategy came too soon and misfired. Disavowed by Magellan's main investors, he left the company in July 1996 (New York Times, Jan. 12 1996; Boston Herald, July 11 1996). 9 As an illustration one can mention a recent project of North Western Mutual, one of the largest American real estate investors. In March 2005, it launched a $ 350 million project in Virginia which combined 800 residential units with 100,000 square meters of class A office space and a 256-room Marriott hotel (New Port Daily Press, March 3 2005). of 2.5 (instead of 1.76 as in the graph) this will be evidence that a major metamorphose has already taken place in the Californian real estate market.
